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ABSTRACT 
The concept of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO is 
as old as the proposal made in 1950 by French Prime Minister Rene Pleven to form a 
European Defense Community (EDC) that would integrate French and German military 
forces into a common European army. However, the differences between French and 
German strategic culture have hampered efforts to establish an ESDI. One of the most 
critical dilemmas stems from the clash between (a) the German belief that United States 
engagement is essential to European stability and should not be undermined and (b) the 
long-standing goal of French leaders to develop a Europe that is more independent of 
American influence. Another key dilemma has involved French efforts to reconcile the 
Gaullist legacy of preserving national autonomy with an ever-increasing commitment to 
European integration and France's growing role in the integrated defense and security 
architecture of Europe. As long as French leaders continue to be influenced by de 
Gaulle's approach to foreign and national security policy, many obstacles to furthering 
the development and strengthening the capabilities of an ESDI will persist. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Together, France and Germany are among the leading powers in developing 
common policies for the European Union (EU), including efforts to provide for the 
establishment of a viable European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Nevertheless, 
the differences between French and German strategic culture have hindered the progress 
toward this aim. One of the most important dilemmas caused by these nations distinctive 
strategic cultures is the clash between (a) the German belief that the engagement and 
leadership role of the United States is essential to maintaining a stabile and secure 
Europe, which should not be undermined by developing institutions that might threaten 
the American commitment to the region, and (b) the long-standing goal ofFrench leaders 
to develop a more independent Europe in which France would have a prominent 
leadership role and in which U.S. influence would be greatly diminished. 
German rejection ofunilateralism for a strong embrace ofmultilateralism as the 
only appropriate way of conducting security affairs is the prominent feature of German 
strategic culture that developed in the post-World War III Cold War years. During this 
same period, the belief in the importance of America's engagement in Europe matured 
from a view held by many Germans as far back as during the early 1920s. Consequently, 
the overriding German commitment to the United States and NATO always limited 
Franco-German defense integration and prevented the establishment of a separate 
European defense and security identity. Today, at the start of a new century that appears 
less threatening to the Germans, they still believe that the Atlantic Alliance should remain 
Europe's primary defense and security organization with an ESDI serving as the main 
European contribution to NATO. 
xi 
Another significant dilemma stems from the 1960s, when de Gaulle started France 
on a separate course outside the integrated command structure of the Atlantic Alliance 
and established a pattern of defending and pursuing national interests. Since this time, 
and especially after the abrupt end to the bipolar Cold War conflict, French leaders have 
had to struggle with the Gaullist tenets that France must preserve its freedom of action 
and avoid integrated military structures, while at the same time advancing European 
integration and policies toward an ESDI. At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, it appears that French leaders are successfully adapting their nations 
strategic culture in order to participate more in the integrated defense and security 
structure of Europe. On the other hand, the desires of the French to promote their national 
interests by maximizing their influence over Europe through greater involvement in 
NATO and by developing the EU and ESDI can be interpreted as Gaullist aspirations. 
Furthermore, Frances's realist concerns about Germany dominating Europe, which is 
based on a historical mistrust of German power, is another key motive for French 
participation in supporting the FRG's full integration in Europe's multilateral institutions. 
While it is possible to say with some confidence that the Germans will continue 
on a resolute path toward advancing European integration and the development of an 
ESDI, it is not so clear that France will remain dedicated to each of these goals. As long 
as French leaders continue to be influenced by the distinctive approach to foreign and 
national security policy established by Charles de Gaulle, many obstacles to Franco-
German cooperation in furthering the development and strengthening the capabilities of a 
European Security and Defense Identity will persist in making this a slow process. 
xii 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the past and present efforts by the Franco-
German partnership to build a viable European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). 
Despite the achievements of France and the Federal Republic of Germany in pursuing a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and joint weapons programs, establishing 
new military institutions such as the Eurocorps, and conducting other security-related 
activities, persistent obstacles to more comprehensive Franco-German success in 
developing ESDI are rooted in their differing strategic cultures. 
The Cold War caused the French and the West Germans to overlook many old 
animosities for reasons of collective defense. Since Germany's reunification in 1990, 
Franco-German cooperation has steadily increased to meet the challenges associated with 
European unification. Together, France and Germany are among the leading powers in 
developing common policies for the European Union, including efforts to provide for a 
security and defense identity. However, most of the European states continue to 'value 
their sovereignty, and wish to pursue their own national interests. France and Germany 
are not exceptions to this principle. Therefore, comments about national interests are 
included in this thesis in order to demonstrate how the differing strategic cultures of 
France and Germany have effected their leader's perceptions of their country's interests 
and, more importantly, how they should pursue these interests. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will compare and contrast the strategic cultures of Germany and 
France using the historical evaluative method. Such an approach looks below the system 
and state levels of analysis of international relations theory to evaluate the beliefs that 
guide policy makers and the consequences of the policies they pursue. 1 On the other 
hand, because the changing international environment and the dynamics of domestic 
decision-making are of crucial importance to understanding the conditions for which 
defense and security policies are developed, both international and domestic factors play 
a key role in the analytical framework of this thesis. The objective is to achieve a deeper 
understanding of the difficulties that the Germans and the French face in developing a 
European Security and Defense Identity. 
The periods examined in this thesis are the interwar years (1918-1939), the post-
World War WCold War years (1946-1989), and the years from the end of the Cold War 
to the present. 
The interwar years are important for a number of reasons, but most of all for 
establishing an understanding of the mistrust that still affects Franco-German cooperation 
today. This was the period in which French and German animosities reached a 
culminating point following a long history of antagonism and war. French efforts to limit 
German power through the Treaty of Versailles, which the United States and eventually 
Great Britain failed to support, caused some French leaders to change their 
1 Margaret Levi, "A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zucherman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, 
Culture, and Structure (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 20. 
2 
,-----------------------------
confrontational strategy against Germany to a more defensive one. 2 However, French 
leaders did not deviate from their nation's strategic culture or abandon the tenacious 
pursuit of national interests, as they perceived them in the 1920s and 1930s.3 During this 
era, the first democratic government of Germany was ultimately unsuccessful, not just 
because of outside pressures and its failed legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, but also 
because many of the decision-makers of the Weimar Republic still accepted certain 
nationalistic and Realpolitik norms of German strategic culture, which they eventually 
chose to pursue behind a veil of cooperation.4 Adolf Hitler would in turn take the most 
destructive aspects of Germany's strategic culture and pursue national interests to the 
extremes that had such devastating consequences for all of Europe. 
The period after the Second World War and the decades of the Cold War offer 
many examples of genuine efforts by France and the Federal Republic of Germany to 
cooperate on matters of collective defense. This cooperation began with the establishment 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949-1950, and a very reserved 
French acceptance in 1954 of the need for the Federal Republic of Germany to establish 
armed forces and become a member of NATO in 1955. 
General de Gaulle ushered in a remarkable new era in 1958 that would lead to 
some Franco-German bilateral agreements and joint military exercises outside the 
2 Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1994), 85. 
3 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our 
Times, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 48-50. 
4 William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World: An International History, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 116-119. 
3 
integrated framework ofNATO. However, de Gaulle also established a pattern of 
defending and pursuing national interests. These Gaullist principles would in turn have 
far-reaching negative and positive consequences for Franco-German defense cooperation 
from the 1960s on. 5 
Throughout the Cold War years, many West German Chancellors also sought 
closer defense ties with France. However, the leaders of the Federal Republic of 
Germany sometimes aggravated the French by not entering into any agreements that 
could upset their country's strong transatlantic relationship with the United States. The 
West Germans also pursued their own national interests during this period in ways that 
were not always fully compatible with the views of their NATO allies, but which never 
strayed too far from the constraints placed on them by the imperatives of alliance 
cohesion.6 
In 1990, as the world emerged from the Cold War, the leaders ofFrance and 
Germany made a new commitment to an old idea of European unification. They also 
determined that a European Security and Defense Identity, "separable but not separate" 
from NATO, is of crucial importance. The main point of convergence between French 
and German motives for unification is European stability, which serves both these 
continental powers' interests much better than a return to the days of unadulterated self-
determination.7 Nevertheless, it appears that French leaders are still struggling with the 
5 Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 149-150. 
6 Stephen A. Kosk, Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe's Strategic 
Choices, 1955-1995 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 102. 
7 Jolyon Howorth, "France," in Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, eds., The European Union and 
National Defense Policy (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 34. 
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Gaullist tenets that France must preserve its sovereign freedom of action and avoid 
integrated military structures, while at the same time advancing European integration and 
policies toward ESDI. 8 In Germany, decision-makers are also grappling with the 
complexities of pursuing their country's national interests, while at the same time 
remaining committed to furthering European integration and security institutions in ways 
that limit the power of the German state, and thereby allay fears that they are seeking to 
establish German hegemony in Europe.9 
To understand the reasoning behind the analysis in this thesis an explanation of 
what "strategic culture" means is imperative. First, it is important to note that a nation's 
strategic culture is part of its larger "political culture," which serves to guide and inform 
the behavior of a particular society or social unit, distinct from other societies.10 The term 
"strategic culture" fulfills the role of explaining a political culture's foreign and national 
security policies. Second, political cultures tend to be highly stable over long periods of 
time, regardless of changing external and internal conditions. Thus, once a distinctive 
approach to foreign and national security policy has taken hold in a society through the 
processes of socialization and institutionalization, it tends "to continue despite changes in 
the circumstances that gave rise to it."11 Third, when a political and strategic culture does 
8 Kosk, Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe's Strategic Choices, 
1955-1995,238. 
9 Paul W. Schroeder, "Does the History of International Politics Go Anywhere?" in David Wetzel and 
Theodore S. Hamerow, eds., International Politics and German History: The Past Informs the Present 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997), 15-36. 
10 Alastair lain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," International Security, vol. 19, no. 4 
(Spring 1995): 45. 
11 Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: 
USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 1990}, 121-122. 
5 
change, it is usually the result of dramatic events that thoroughly discredit the core beliefs 
and values of the affected society. 12 To understand the differences in the strategic cultures 
of France and Germany today requires an examination of European history from 1918 to 
the end of the twentieth century, including the dramatic effect that the Second World War 
had in changing the core beliefs and values of the German people and their leaders. 
Chapter II of this thesis is divided into two sections. At first the German 
commitment to NATO is presented to show the effects this has had on Franco-German 
defense and security cooperation, and the establishment of an ESDI. The second half of 
the chapter examines Franco-German successes and difficulties in working together to 
advance their own bilateral defense and security arrangements and an ESDI. 
Chapters m and IV analyze the strategic cultures of Germany and France during 
the interwar period, the post-World War WCold War years, and the period from the end 
of the Cold War in 1989-1991 to the present, in order to present an accurate picture of 
both countries' national predispositions toward defense and security strategy. 
Chapter V summarizes the two key dilemmas that have hindered the Franco-
German efforts to establish a viable European Security and Defense Identity, and the 
continuing effects these dilemmas may have in limiting the prospects for the successful 
pursuit of an ESDI. 
12 John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German 
Security Policy After Unification (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 23. 
6 
II. THE FRANCO-GERMAN PARTNERSHIP AND ESDI 
A. GERMANY'S COMMITMENT TO THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE 
From the very beginning of the post-World War II era, West German politicians 
actively sought the multilateral integration of their country into a Western security 
alliance. As early as 1947, the Americans and the British had determined that the 
strategic position and economic resources of the West German zones were invaluable to 
the Western allies in the growing struggle against Soviet Communism. This led to the 
decision at the London conference in June 1948 to authorize the creation of a West 
German state, which triggered numerous emotional debates among the Western allies and 
within Germany itself. 13 The leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in western 
Germany, Kurt Schumacher, wanted a unified and neutral Germany integrated within a 
Western European alliance that also supported neutrality over participation in the global 
contest between the two superpowers.14 Konrad Adenauer, the leader of the more 
conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Party that won the first election in the 
FRG, was determined that the new West German state would be firmly tied to a strong 
alliance of Western democracies that opposed the communist East bloc. Adenauer also 
accepted the division of Germany, because he believed if the West remained strong, ''the 
illegitimate East German regime would eventually collapse."15 The old option of 
13 John W. Young, Cold War Europe 1945-89: Apolitical history (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), 55-
57. As expected, the French could only be won over to this idea by American and British assurances that 
the new West German government's independence would be limited by various allied controls over its 
resources, and continued disarmament. 
14 Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World: An International History, 277. 
15 Young, Cold War Europe 1945-89: A political history, 61. 
7 
following a separate nationalistic course was not left open to the German politicians, nor 
was it accepted by most of the German people after the Second World War. 16 
What followed from the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
spring of 1949 was the development of a continued belief by FRG officials that German 
interests were best served through the multilateral integration of their country in the 
transatlantic alliance with the United States, Canada, and other West European powers. 17 
This is a belief undiminished by the end of the Cold War and the reunification of 
Germany. 
The toughest internal issue involving the pro-Western policy of the FRG has been 
resolving which part of the Alliance should be given precedence, the U.S. or the 
European relationship. Although this is an issue that FRG officials have always had to 
weigh, it was most notably debated during the early 1960s and again in the early 1990s. 
The first of these debates stemmed from the initiatives by General de Gaulle to reduce the 
West European reliance on the United States, replacing the American leadership position 
with French influence. To realize his goal of ''French hegemony in Western Europe," de 
Gaulle used a combination of rapprochement and pressure on FRG leaders to gain their 
support.18 It is also important to note that there were a number of key reasons for 
Adenauer to be receptive to de Gaulle's offers of reconciliation during the early 1960s. 
16 Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security 
Policy After Unification, 61. 
17 Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1995), 11. 
18 Sir Michael Howard, "A Europe of the Three: The Historical Context," Parameters XXIV, no. 4 
(Winter 1994-95): 45. 
8 
The building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, the increasing threat of nuclear war 
between the superpowers, mistrust of President Kennedy's "flexible response" doctrine 
and concerns that he would pursue detente with Moscow at Germany's expense, as well 
as the internal problems of Adenauer's government, such as the Strauss affair with Der 
Spiegel magazine at the end of 1962, and the SPD's growing willingness to talk with the 
Eastern bloc, all drew the West German Chancellor closer to the French President.19 
However, when Ludwig Erhard replaced Konrad Adenauer as the West German 
Chancellor in 1963, the pro-American views of the "Atlanticists" overcame those of the 
"Gaullist" camp. The West German government had decided that American protection 
was more certain than what the French could offer.20 Ironically, U.S. President Johnson 
ensured Erhard's downfall in 1966, by forcing the Germans to buy military hardware 
from America to offset U.S. defense costs in Germany. Erhard looked weak on the world 
stage, and the tax increases he proposed in order to pay for the military equipment caused 
him to lose the support of the Free Democrats Party (FDP), which was the junior 
coalition partner with the CDU. Without the FOP's support, "his foreign policy 
questioned, and even his reputation as an economic wizard tarnished," Erhard had to 
resign?1 
19 Young, Cold War Europe 1945-89: A political history, 65.In October 1962 the magazine Der 
Spiegel printed an article, based on classified material, which exposed problems in Defense Minister Franz 
Josef Strauss's policies. In response, Adenauer and Strauss not only had the magazine's offices searched 
but also arrested its editor, which led to a public outcry and the FDP ministers left the government coalition 
until Strauss resigned. 
20 Klaus Hildebrand, German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer: The limits of statecraft 
(London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 203-204. 
21 Young, Cold War Europe 1945-89: Apolitical history, 66-67. 
9 
The early 1990s debate about Germany's priorities of commitment to the 
transatlantic alliance vs. Europe began with a series of broad Franco-German proposals 
"for creating a true European security identity within the framework of the European 
Community," which would be "formed around the Western European Union (WEU)."22 
However, the debate gained considerable momentum when, on October 14, 1991, 
President Mitterrand of France and Chancellor Kohl of Germany announced their 
proposal to build a "European army corps" around the existing Franco-German brigade. 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain were supportive of the "Eurocorps" idea. In contrast, 
Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States disliked the proposal 
either because of the bilateral way in which it was conceived, or because it was viewed as 
a potential threat to NAT0.23 
The leaders of many European nations still believed that the European defense 
and security efforts should remain under NATO's control, and they were unenthusiastic 
about the European Union gaining a role in defense. These countries were also concerned 
that European defense efforts would duplicate those of NATO and that European 
attempts to gain military autonomy would send a message to the United States that it was 
no longer needed in European affairs. They worried that a new WEU command 
arrangement would confuse those already in place under NATO's integrated commands 
and argued that it would be excessively costly for Europe to attempt to do alone what it 
was already doing together with the United States. For the smaller countries in particular, 
22 Gordon, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance, 40. 
23 Howorth, "France," in Howorth and Menon, eels., The European Union and National Defense 
Policy, 26. 
10 
there was also a concern that an EU security structure would be dominated by a Franco-
German axis: these countries preferred "to entrust their security to the distant, powerful, 
and more disinterested United States than to the French and the Germans. "24 
The intensity of disquiet that the Eurocorps announcement caused in the United 
States was expressed most clearly at the Rome NATO summit in early November 1991, 
when President George Bush stated: "If, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide 
independently for your own defense, the time to tell us is today."25 Washington indeed 
saw the proposal for forming a European corps as a clear challenge to NATO's primacy. 
As John S. Duffield has noted: 
It [the Eurocorps] would duplicate the alliance's existing capabilities and 
possibly reduce its operational effectiveness. By diverting scarce defense 
resources, it would necessarily diminish the European commitment to 
NATO. And it might undermine public support for NATO in the United 
States and intensify Congressional pressure to accelerate the withdrawal of 
U.S. forces from the continent. Thus, all in all, it threatened to cause 
NATO to unravel.26 
In France, the Eurocorps proposal appeared acceptable to all of the major political 
factions. In fact, the French emphasis on developing a European Security and Defense 
Identity and forming the Eurocorps was the result of France's discomfort over the rapid 
military changes within NATO, which were meant to produce both the capabilities and 
legal authority for intervention abroad. "French leaders argued that to allow NATO to 
24 Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 173. 
25 George Bush quoted in Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International 
Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification, 135-136. 
26 Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security 
Policy After Unification, 136. 
11 
take the lead in organizing security in Eastern Europe or the Third World is to short-
circuit the growing potential for other, more appropriate bodies, such as the United 
Nations, the European Community, and the CSCE, to take on those roles.'m The 
broadening ofNATO's geographical and political scope would also give Washington an 
excuse to maintain and expand its leadership role in Europe, which the French strongly 
disliked. 28 The Eurocorps proposal was partially a French reaction to NATO forming the 
ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which was not given an explicit "out-of area" role 
and could not be called a formal expansion of NATO, but was clearly a first step in this 
direction. As Philip H. Gordon has noted: 
France saw the creation of the RRC as a blatant attempt to preempt the 
creation of a more autonomous European security structure and instead to 
bring European forces under the aegis of the United Kingdom, United 
States, and NATO. French officials were apparently 'livid' about what 
they saw as an 'Anglo-Saxon' move to act within NATO before Europe 
had a chance to develop its own proposals. 29 
In Germany, the only negative reaction to forming the Eurocorps came from the 
SPD. The leaders of the main opposition party argued against the integration of German 
forces in any international structures except NATO or for their possible use by the U.N. 
However, from the main German point of view, neither the Eurocorps nor any other 
defense and security projects Germany has initiated with France should be seen as a 
threat to the Atlantic Alliance. On the contrary, German officials have repeatedly asserted 
that their cooperation with France in support of a European Security and Defense Identity 
27 Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy, 170-171. 
28 Howorth, "France," in Howorth and Menon, The European Union and National Defense Policy, 26. 
29 Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy, 171. 
12 
is meant to strengthen the European contribution to NATO, not to develop a completely 
independent capability to replace the alliance. Also, German officials often point out that 
they are "drawing France closer to NATO" through steps that the French are not willing 
to initiate themselves. 30 In a sense, Germany is acting as a conduit for greater Euro-
Atlantic integration. For the Germans, the continued multilateral integration of their 
country in NATO while working toward the establishment of a more unified Europe at 
the same time is not contradictory, but provides the surest means by which stability and 
peace in Europe can be maintained. 31 
Throughout the rest of 1991 and 1992, the details of the Eurocorps concept were 
worked out among the chief military officials ofFrance, Germany, and the United States, 
resulting in an accord approved by the North Atlantic Council on December 22, 1992, 
that recognized the Eurocorps as an accepted means by which the Europeans could 
contribute more to their own security. Moreover, as part of the accord, France agreed 
with Germany and the United States to make the Eurocorps available for use by NATO 
as well as the EC. 32 
B. FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY 
Despite the traditional debate over German priorities to the Atlantic Alliance vs. 
Europe, it would be difficult to point out another European country that has been more 
30 Howard, "A Europe of the Three: The Historical Context," 47. 
31 Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security 
Policy After Unification, 220-222. 




committed to furthering European integration than the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Since the founding of the FRG in 1949, there have been numerous examples to support 
this judgement, and most of these involve the development of the Franco-German 
relationship, especially in the area of defense and security cooperation. The first of these 
examples stemmed from the U.S. call for the establishment of armed forces in the FRG in 
October 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War earlier that year. The French 
reaction to the U.S. proposal became known as the Pleven Plan, named after the French 
Prime Minister who called for the formation of a European Defense Community (EDC) 
"that would integrate French and German military forces into a common European 
anny.'m The first West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, saw the EDC proposal as 
a way in which the FRG could be accepted as an equal partner in an integrated Europe, 
and became a strong supporter of the Pleven Plan. The equality with their former German 
enemy that the EDC represented proved too much for the French, however and, after a 
long debate, the plan was finally rejected by their parliament in 1954. Despite this failure, 
West Germany did acquire national military forces in 1955 through another solution that 
integrated the FRG in NATO and the WEU. 34 
Except for some exploratory talks on developing nuclear technology together in 
the late 1950s, the next period that advanced Franco-German security and defense 
cooperation did not come until Charles de Gaulle returned to power in France in 1958. 
Chancellor Adenauer and the French president shared a mistrust of American reliability, 
33 Gordon, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance, 12. 
34 Ibid., 12. Of these two defense organizations, the WEU "became little more than a European forum 
to control German rearmament." 
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and wanted to create a more independent European defense capability. In the last years of 
the Eisenhower administration, American defense theorists were severely criticizing the 
"all or nothing" strategy of massive retaliation. Under the Kennedy administration, this 
outmoded doctrine was replaced by a new approach called "flexible response," which 
relied "on variety of military measures- conventional, tactical nuclear, or strategic 
nuclear- to counter Soviet aggression in Western Europe."35 The new strategy seemed to 
acknowledge that the threat of nuclear retaliation was no longer a credible deterrent when 
the United States was now in range of Soviet missiles. The European reaction to 
Kennedy's "flexible response" doctrine was very negative, as Keylor has pointed out: 
... by reserving maximum flexibility for the American president to 
determine the time, place, and manner of a military response to Soviet 
action, it inevitably heightened insecurity among America's European 
allies, who had become accustomed to depending on the certainty of an 
unconditional American guarantee. Many observers in Europe interpreted 
the new doctrine as a thinly disguised effort to renege on the pledge of 
nuclear retaliation against a Soviet conventional attack. 36 
The culminating point of de Gaulle's and Adenauer's efforts to promote French 
and German reconciliation, develop their own comm0n approach for the defense of 
Western Europe, and institutionalize Franco-German defense cooperation was the signing 
of the Elysee Treaty in January 1963. However, the relationship between the two 
countries had begun to regress well before this date. The primary causes of the 
breakdown included de Gaulle's unacceptable intentions to strengthen the French 
leadership position in Western Europe at the expense of the FRG, and the final 
35 Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World: An International History, 328. 
36 Ibid., 328. 
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unwillingness of the Western Germans "to lose touch with the Americans."37 The West 
German Bundestag had even refused to ratify the Elysee Treaty without attaching a 
preamble to it stating the FRG's ''unwavering commitment to NATO and the British 
participation in the EEC."38 The combination of this preamble, the replacement of 
Adenauer with Erhard in October 1963, and other subsequent victories of the Atlanticists 
over the Gaullists in the tense West German disputes of 1964 effectively put an end to de 
Gaulle's chances of gaining support from the FRG for his causes, and once more limited 
Franco-German cooperation until the mid-1970s.39 
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard preferred to work much more closely with Washington 
than with Paris, despite his own misgivings about the U.S. commitment to Europe. 
Erhard's negotiations with President Lyndon Johnson on the Multilateral Force (MLF), a 
proposal to create a fleet of surface vessels equipped with Polaris A-3 nuclear missiles 
that never came to fruition, and his role in establishing the FRG's involvement in 
coordinating NATO's nuclear doctrine through the creation of the Alliance's Nuclear 
Planning Group (NPG) in 1965 were influential in ending de Gaulle's attempts to 
develop an independent and self-assertive Europe with German help.40 
There was only some limited Franco-German arms collaboration in the late 1960s. 
Although Chancellor Willy Brandt was not an ardent Atlanticist like Erhard had been, his 
37 Howard, "A Europe of the Three: The Historical Context," 46. 
38 Gordon, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance, 14. De Gaulle had rejected Great Britain's 
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39 Ibid., 14. 
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main priority in the early 1970s was advancing new West German relationships with East 
European states, not France. In fact, Brandt's Ostpolitik policies conflicted with 
"France's own (self-designated) role as the special interlocutor of the Communist half of 
Europe."41 Then after 1974, when Helmet Schmidt replaced Brandt, Franco-German 
cooperation began to advance again. However, the leaders of the two countries, Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing of France and Schmidt of Germany, were brought together more 
because ofthe urgent economic matters arising from the 1973 oil price increases, than for 
reasons of defense cooperation. In 197 4, ''Franco-German consolidation and coordination 
focused on combating inflation and forestalling protectionism; during 1975, the main 
problem was restoring economic growth after the deflationary measures of the preceding 
year.'.42 
Although he was an Atlanticist when it came to West Germany's defense posture, 
Schmidt welcomed President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's efforts within France to renew 
support for the commitment to German and European security, eliminating what had 
become a French distinction "between the battle for Germany and the battle for 
France.'.43 In July 1974, the agreement that contained the terms of reference for the joint 
contingency planning from the Second French Corps in West Germany was extended to 
the First French Army in its entirety, making French participation in the defense of West 
Germany more practical and effective. "Giscard d'Estaing also increased French 
41 DavidS. Yost, "Franco-German Defense Cooperation," in Stephen F. Szabo, ed., The Bundeswehr 
and Western Security (London: Macmillan, 1990), 220. 
42 Kosk, Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe's Strategic Choices, 
1955-1995, 123. 
43 Ibid., 123-125. 
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investments in conventional force modernization, partly as a consequence of his 
dialogues on strategic affairs with Schmidt. "44 
Franco-German cooperation received another boost when President Jimmy Carter 
cancelled the deployment of the neutron bomb to the FRG in 1978. This incident had put 
the Schmidt government at great political risk, raised fears about U.S. reliability once 
again, and reinvigorated French and German desires to create a European security and 
defense capability to supplement NAT0.45 Nevertheless, this period of Franco-German 
cooperation also became unsustainable by the end of the 1970s. Several events- French 
retraction based on conservative fears that Giscard d'Estaing was "selling out France's 
hard-fought independence," the controversy that began in 1979 surrounding the potential 
deployment ofU.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) to West Germany and other 
Western European countries, the Soviet invasion of Mghanistan in the same year, and the 
Soviet crackdown in Poland in 1981 - served to remind the West Germans that their best 
ally was still the United States.46 
At the end of 1982, the two new leaders of France and Germany were working 
together to revive Franco-German security and defense cooperation. Although Helmut 
Kohl of Germany was a conservative Christian Democrat and Francois Mitterrand was 
the leader of the French Socialist Party, both men were strong supporters ofNATO, 
nuclear deterrence, and a hard-line policy toward the Soviets. The first important steps 
44 Yost, "Franco-German Defense Cooperation," in Szabo, ed., The Bundeswehr and Western Security, 
220-221. 
45 Gordon, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance, 16-17. 
46 Ibid., 16. 
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taken by Kohl and Mitterrand were the implementation of the Elysee Treaty defense 
clauses, and the establishment of a commission for institutionalizing the exchange of 
French and German ideas on defense and security policy. The first success of this 
commission was an improvement in French-German military-industrial cooperation. The 
next key step was the relaunching of the WEU in 1984, with Mitterrand appearing more 
sincere than his predecessors about establishing a "European pillar" to supplement and 
not undermine NATO. The French President also gave other support to the German 
Chancellor, by publicly endorsing the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile 
deployments in Germany, and by creating the Force d' Action Rap ide (FAR) that could 
intervene more quickly in Central Europe than any preexisting French military forces. 47 
In the mid-1980s, as the United States negotiated with the Soviet Union on arms 
control and even bargained with Gorbachev about the U.S. nuclear guarantee to NATO 
Europe, Kohl and Mitterrand became more determined to increase Franco-German 
defense cooperation.48 1n October 1986, at the summit conference in Reykjavik, Iceland, 
U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev "-without any prior 
consultation with their respective allies - came to the verge of endorsing a remarkable 
proposal that would have abolished all ballistic missiles and possibly set the stage for 
total nuclear disarmament.'.49 Even though this scheme did not come to fruition, the two 
superpower leaders signed a historic agreement in Washington on 8 December 1987, 
47 Kosk, Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe's Strategic Choices, 
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which eliminated all their intermediate-range ground-based missiles, including those in 
Europe. 5° In September 1987, partly in response to the U.S.-Soviet negotiations, France 
and West Germany conducted the largest joint military maneuvers in the history of their 
partnership. Operation Bold Sparrow was a purely Franco-German exercise outside the 
NATO structure that took place on German and French territory, placed French troops 
under German command for the first time, and demonstrated the capabilities of the 
FAR. 51 Yet, no matter how much exercises such as Bold Sparrow seemed to be 
advancing the partnership, there remained many fundamental differences between French 
and German views, which prevented the development of more comprehensive Franco-
German defense policies and structures in the mid-1980s. From the West German side, 
these differences involved the possession of nuclear weapons, the projection of German 
military forces, the primacy of German unification, and a higher commitment to NATO 
than to the Franco-German partnership. 52 
At the end of the 1980s, as the reforms started by Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev began to alter the international structure of the world, the focus of the Franco-
German partnership also changed. The French feared that the Reagan-Gorbachev "zero 
option" proposal on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in Europe and the German pursuit 
of"disarmament and detente" with Moscow would bring about an end to NATO's 
so Ibid., 453. 
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reliance on a strategy of deterrence. Thus, Mitterrand perceived a need to offer new 
measures to bolster the Franco-German defense partnership and thereby ''build up 
Western Europe's assertion of its defense interests vis-a-vis the United States," and avert 
German "tendencies toward neutralism" and sentiments that supported the 
denuclearization of Europe. President Reagan's actions had also caused Chancellor Kohl 
to distrust American reliability, and "for the first time since joining the Atlantic Alliance, 
the West German government began to show an interest in developing Franco-German 
defense ties as a possible long-term alternative to NAT0."53 
On the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Elysee Treaty, January 22, 1988, Kohl and 
Mitterrand created the Franco-German Defense and Security Council to further improve 
the institutional exchange of views begun by the Commission on Security and Defense in 
1982.54 The council's primary functions were to be: 
1. The development of common concepts in the area of defense and security. 
2. The progressive harmonization of French and German positions on all questions 
having to do with European defense and security, including the areas of arms 
control and disarmament. 
3. The responsibility for decisions in regards to joint military units such as the 
Franco-German brigade. 
4. The responsibility for decisions in regards to bilateral military maneuvers, joint 
officer training, and other support arrangements. 
5. The responsibility for the upgrading of the equipment and interoperability of 
the French and German armed forces, and improvement of cooperation in 
armament production. 55 
53 Ibid., 201-202. 
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In September 1988, another joint French-German exercise was conducted in 
France, and in October 1990 the 4,200-member Franco-German brigade was created. Yet 
regardless of the growing number of symbolic activities linking France and Germany, the 
partnership had not proven that it was "actually capable of making policy decisions and 
perhaps even executing joint military actions."56 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Kohl government faced many new challenges 
associated with the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany as a whole and 
fully sovereign state. Although some of these new issues could have caused a return of 
more nationalistic policies, the political leaders in Bonn chose not only to maintain, but 
also to increase their country's multilateral integration in European institutions. The 
primary German motives behind this course of action included desires to maintain the 
peace and allay their neighbors' fears, to advance their own economic interests, and to be 
part of a stronger Europe that could compete more effectively with the rest of the world. 57 
Thus, along with France, Germany has become one of the driving forces behind the 
transformation of the European Community into the European Union (EU), with the 
initial intent to bind the member states to each other economically. It is hoped that 
momentum will eventually transform the EU into a true political union, which would 
require a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and common European security 
and defense capabilities. 58 
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Following the formation of the Franco-German brigade, the first major advance in 
the construction of a European Security and Defense Identity came when the Franco-
German proposals to establish a common foreign and security policy and to make the 
WEU the defense arm of the EU were agreed to by the rest of the EC members in the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) at Maastricht in December 1991. The other provisions 
in this treaty "established a timetable for the creation of a European central bank and 
single European currency," which were meant to increase the pace of European 
integration. The provisions were also important for creating a stronger foundation for the 
emergence of a common European defense."59 
At the same time as the negotiations that led to the Maastricht agreement, another 
Kohl-Mitterrand proposal launched the formation of the "Eurocorps," which was to be a 
fully operational force of some 40,000 soldiers by late 1995. Although the initial units 
allocated to this new military organization were French and German, all EU members 
were encouraged to contribute forces to make the Eurocorps more than just a Franco-
German entity. By April1998, the Eurocorps was some 65,000 soldiers strong 
representing France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain.60 
In June 1992, the tasks for which WEU military units could be used were laid out 
in the Petersberg Declaration by the WED's Council of Ministers. According to the 
declaration, "in addition to the continuing collective defense obligations of the WEU 
59 Kosk, Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe's Strategic Choices, 
1955-1995,220. 
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members under the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, 'military 
units of the WEU member States, acting under the authority of the WEU, could be 
employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping'."61 Thus, with the Petersberg 
Declaration, it became clear that the WEU military units such as the Eurocorps could be 
used for both collective defense and collective security missions and, with the North 
Atlantic Council's decision in December 1992, such units could perform these missions 
under the auspices ofNATO or the WEU in situations when NATO would be "neither 
willing nor able to intervene."62 
The next major step that contributed to advancing the development of an ESDI 
came at the NATO Summit in January 1994, when a new institutional mechanism called 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) was accepted as a way to provide NATO assets for 
use in a WEU-led operation, "or [by] 'coalitions of the willing' composed of self-selected 
Allies and non-NATO countries."63 However, as had happened so many times before, 
this highly productive period for the development of an ESDI was followed by a decrease 
in activity until the Kohl government mounted a new campaign in 1996 to improve the 
EU decision-making process on security issues, and to tighten the relationship between 
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the WEU and the EU.64 Moreover, at the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in June 
1996, the establishment of a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO was 
reaffirmed with strong German and French support. 65 
In the mid and late 1990s, as the establishment of a single European currency and 
other economic and political developments by the EU began to pick up momentum, and 
military operations in the Balkans intensified, cooperation among European Union 
members on a CFSP and an ESDI became even more important. Thus, the fundamental 
differences among the French, the Germans and other EU members concerning their 
views on European security started to be worked out in greater detail, and the British 
government began to take more interest in an ESDI within NATO as wel1.66 
At the end of the 1990s and beginning of the twenty-first century, the new leaders 
of France and Germany, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder, have vowed that their 
governments will continue to support and advance what their predecessors have 
accomplished through a close Franco-German partnership.67 One of those early Franco-
German initiatives, the Euroco:rps, has steadily progressed. On 18 April 2000, the 
commanding general of the Euroco:rps, Juan Ortuno of Spain, along with 350 members of 
his staff from the Corps' headquarters located in Strasbourg, France, became the primary 
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command and control element for the 46,000 strong NATO-led force in Kosovo 
(KFOR).6s 
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III. GERMAN STRATEGIC CULTURE 
A. THE INTERWAR YEARS, 1918-1939 
If dramatic events can change a people's political and strategic culture, there are 
few examples better than Germany's twentieth century experiences to illustrate this point. 
The devastation of two world wars, foreign occupation, partitioning and the Cold War 
have indeed contributed many significant changes to the ways in which the Germans 
relate to the rest of the world. However, the First World War contributed the least to 
advancing the aspects of German strategic culture oriented to international cooperation 
and enhanced militaristic and nationalistic tendencies. As Richard Bessel has noted: 
Despite the antipathy towards war and the military which 'the years 1914-
18' had generated, the most bloody and futile war which Germany had yet 
experienced was followed not by more conciliatory patterns of political 
life but by an upsurge in violence and military practices in civil politics: 
by military ideologies, by military forms of political organization, by the 
activities of uniformed formations which sought to recreate an idealized 
military community in civil society.69 
The reason why the Germans were unable to overcome extreme nationalism and 
militarism in the interwar years can be attributed to the inconclusive way in which the 
First World War ended and the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty.70 Many Germans 
preferred to believe that their military forces had not been defeated in the field and could 
have gone on fighting until victorious, if only they had not been stabbed in the back. 
Martin Wight, the British historian and international relations expert, wrote: 
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The obvious ... aspect of the Nazi movement was that of a national revival 
after defeat. Its most potent myths in conquering Germany were those of 
the Dolchstoss in den Ruecken, the army stabbed in the back by the 
civilian November traitors, the fiction that Germany had not been 
militarily defeated in the First World War; and of the Versailler Diktat, the 
Allies imposing mutilation, servitudes, and tribute upon Germany by force 
and treachery. Its most potent claim in recovering for Germany the 
position to dominate Europe was Gleichberechtigung, the restoration of 
Germany's equality of rights in the international community, the ending of 
the servitudes of Versailles. 71 
Such a myth made the preservation of democracy extremely hard for the fledgling 
Weimar government, which was unfairly blamed for the loss of the war and for not 
obtaining better terms for Germany at Versailles.72 This, in turn, caused a significant 
amount of social and political chaos, in which various political organizations from both 
the Left and the Right openly challenged the legitimacy of the government, often making 
attempts to overthrow it.73 Many of the leaders of these rival political organizations on 
the Right were former military men who gained public support, because the military had 
not been discredited by the outcome of the war and even continued to be revered by most 
Germans.74 Furthermore, many of the leading politicians of the Weimar Republic found it 
impossible to accept the terms of the Versailles Treaty, and some of them did everything 
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possible to circumvent the restrictions on Germany. One of the first Chancellors of the 
new Republic, Joseph Wirth, approved of General Hans von Seeckt' s independent policy 
of training Reichswehr soldiers on Russian soil, out of view of the French and other 
Allied Powers. 75 
The secret military arran~ements with the Soviets, which began in the winter of 
1920-21 and were strengthened by the Rappallo·Treaty in 1922, also allowed the German 
army "to engage in the production and testing of military aircraft, tanks, poison gases, 
and other weapons outlawed by the Versailles Treaty."76 In turn, this clandestine program 
of rearmament, which was approved by successive Weimar governments throughout the 
1920s, would provide Hitler with a solid base from which to complete the reconstruction 
of Germany's military might.77 
The most astute of the Weimar politicians was Gustav Stresemann, who, as the 
German Chancellor in 1923 and later the Foreign Minister from November 1923 until his 
premature death in October 1929, appeared to be working for the peaceful reintegration 
of Germany into Europe under the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. Yet at the same 
time, Stresemann was setting the stage for reclaiming lost eastern territories, secretly 
rebuilding the German military with Soviet assistance, and making another attempt at the 
old German goal of dominating eastern Europe. In other words, German foreign policy 
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under Stresemann and other Weimar political leaders in the 1920s was a revival of 
Schaukelpolitik, pitting west against east and vice versa as the need suited. 78 
Before Stresemann began his new approach to resolve Germany's political 
problems, the attempts by earlier Weimar governments to negotiate with the Allied 
Powers concerning the impracticability of reparation payments had turned to passive 
resistance. The fear of losing the Rhineland to the French and the rest of Germany to 
Bolshevism almost turned this passiveness into active resistance by the ultra-radicals of 
the Right. 79 Then in the mid-1920s, Gustav Stresemann persuaded the most powerful 
members of German society, the industrialists, to help stabilize the economy and make an 
"attempt to reach an understanding with the foreign Powers."80 Of all the allied countries, 
the United States quickly proved to be the most receptive to German efforts to improve 
Berlin's relationship with the West. Washington's participation in implementing the 
Versailles Treaty had ended with the departure of America's Rhine occupation forces in 
January 1923, mostly due to what the Americans considered extreme attempts by the 
French to make Germany abide by the terms of the Versailles Treaty.81 By 1924, the 
United States was ready to participate in repudiating the "Carthaginian peace" that 
Versailles represented. Stresemann' s first success with American support was negotiating 
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the Dawes Plan in 1924, which was the first major revision of the Versailles Treaty to 
Germany's advantage; it helped reduce the German debt and the "coercive power of the 
French-dominated Reparations Commission."82 
Stresemann's second great accomplishment with U.S. assistance, the Locamo 
Treaty of 1925, came as a result of his understanding that he could achieve some of 
Germany's most important foreign policy objectives by making concessions to the West 
and satisfying French security concerns. This meant acknowledging the loss of Alsace-
Lorraine to France and accepting the demilitarized status of the Rheinland, which 
Germany agreed to in the Locamo Treaty. In return for these concessions, the French 
agreed to evacuate their military forces from the Rheinland, and to reduce the size and 
authority of the Allied inspection team once the Germans showed some measure of good 
faith in regards to fulfilling the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty.83 
However, the Locamo Treaty made no reference to a specific German agreement to 
continue disarmament, or to recognize Germany's borders with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. 84 Therefore, the Western Powers had left the way open for Stresemann 
and his successors to continue Germany's clandestine rearmament even more secure from 
Allied observation, and to eventually pursue plans of gaining territorial compensation in 
Eastern Europe. 85 
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The other main condition in the Locarno Treaty was that it would not enter into 
force until Germany was admitted into the League of Nations. This occurred on 
September 10, 1926, finally returning Germany to a position in which to "participate on 
an equal footing with the victorious Allies in the deliberations concerning the future of 
Europe."86 This was also the beginning of what the British government then deemed to be 
the surest way of guaranteeing the security of Europe. The British favored "appeasement 
of Germany's grievances and her readmission to the ranks of peace-loving powers," 
while the French believed ''that their security depended on keeping Germany as weak as 
possible for the foreseeable future."87 The British were well-intentioned, but the French 
suspicions about Stresemann's motives for resolving the political disputes with Paris and 
London were well-founded. 
By the beginning of the 1930s, the German experiment with democracy was 
already nearing its end, due to the inherent weaknesses of the Weimar Republic, 
increasing German revisionism, and the enduring stigma of the Versailles Treaty. Then, 
as the economic situation darkened once more with the spread of the Great Depression, 
Hitler saw his opportunity to take advantage of the crumbling Weimar government to 
legally become the leader of the German people. 88 The Munich putsch in 1923 had been a 
premature attempt to seize control by force, but this was followed by ten years of Nazi 
consolidation and an adherence to legality, which gained Hitler the support of Germany's 
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socioeconomic elite: the East Prussian landowners, industrialists, and high-ranking 
military officers. 89 
Hitler's success with the German people was based on a mix of popular rhetoric, 
or propaganda, promising to relieve them of their economic burdens, to protect them 
from the communists and the Jews, and to reverse the wrongs perpetrated on Germany 
through the Versailles Treaty.90 Moreover, Hitler's rhetoric called on certain then-
prominent norms of German strategic culture, such as nationalism and militarism, to add 
greater legitimacy to his dictatorial regime and its agenda. As Richard Bessel and Martin 
Wight have put it: 
Nazi mobilization was not based upon realistic discussion of social needs 
and economic priorities; Nazi propaganda was a successful attempt to 
transcend such discussion, to 'elevate' politics to the level of myth and 
fiction. 91 
The Nazi Revolution ... gathered up all the forces of German history, the 
military fanaticism of the Prussian army, the unscrupulous tenacity of the 
Junkers and their hatred of the Poles, the demand for economic empire of 
the industrialists and their middle-class supporters, the 'Austrian mission' 
wherewith the Habsburg Monarchy had justified its ascendancy in Eastern 
Europe, giving all these a demonic drive and intensity through a mass 
support they had not previously possessed. 92 
From January 1933 to the end of the Second World War, Germany's foreign 
policy and the internal control of the Reich were firmly in the hands of AdolfHitler and 
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his Nazi party deputies. The Germans that were not deceived by National Socialism 
either had to remain silent" and hope for an eventual return of normality, or leave the 
country. Many writers, artists, political leaders, scientists and other intellectuals, of 
Jewish as well as non-Jewish descent, left Germany throughout the 1930s; staying meant 
that one risked being placed in a concentration camp.93 
It wasn't until 1945 that the Germans could collectively begin to decide just how 
far Hitler had led them astray, using many elements of their historic strategic culture and 
the racist militarism that grew out of"total mobilization" in the First World War. As 
Michael Geyer has commented: 
... for the National Socialists war was a way of life. National Socialist war 
was war for the sake of social reconstruction through the destruction of 
conquered societies. Total discretionary power over subjugated people 
was to maintain and guarantee the social life organization of the Germans. 
A terrorist racism became the essence of National Socialist politics as its 
leaders strove toward war. In their mind, it was the foundation on which 
the war-making capabilities of the Third Reich rested, just as its expansion 
was the major goal that war would achieve.94 
B. THE POST-WORLD WAR II AND COLD WAR YEARS, 1946-1989 
Due to the disastrous experiences of the Hitler regime and the Second World War, 
much of Germany's previous political and strategic culture was destroyed along with its 
proponents, and the Germans became much more receptive to "alternative beliefs and 
values, creating a situation in which a new political culture could take root. "95 Thus, the 
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extreme nationalism and militarism of the past was replaced by a new set of principles 
accepted by a substantial majority of the German political elite, which JohnS. Duffield 
has identified as the following: 
1. The acceptance of the idea that the German nation-state is part of"a larger 
European entity." 
2. The strong belief that "international disputes can be resolved peacefully." 
3. The strong preference for economic and political integration as a means to 
promote European stability. 
4. The realization that multilateralism and integration serve "concrete German 
interests" much better than pursuing "a separate national course."96 
In the case of the first principle, the idea that Germany was part of a European 
system was not new in 1945-46. This idea had been on everyone's mind well before the 
German states were united as one country in 1871, and especially during the time of the 
Third Reich. What had been reinforced by the disasters of following an intensely 
nationalistic course was the belief among the Germans themselves that European 
integration was the best way to limit the destructive powers of nationalism. In fact, after 
the Second World War, the West Germans wanted ''to be as inconspicuous as possible 
and to demonstrate the fact that they were just a western European nation like all the 
others."97 Over time, the belief that Germany's vital national interests also coincided with 
furthering a highly integrated Europe took hold in Bonn and became "one of the 
foundations of German political culture. "98 
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During the era of Konrad Adenauer's service as Chancellor, 1949-1963, the West 
German goal of becoming integrated in a larger Europe focused exclusively on the West, 
and Adenauer utterly rejected the idea of recognizing East German sovereignty, or 
negotiating with the Soviets about Moscow's idea of accepting German unification in 
return for neutrality. By the end of the 1960s, Chancellor Willy Brandt had established a 
new policy of detente with the Eastern bloc. 99 Brandt's Ostpolitik set a precedent for his 
successors: German leaders had to work with all of Europe, East and West, for the good 
of Germany and Europe as a whole. The pre-war view of most Germans, who "regarded 
inter-state relations as an intensely competitive and unforgiving struggle for existence," 
was replaced by one that favored peaceful cooperation. 100 
The second principle, the view that international disputes can be resolved 
peacefully, took on many different forms in Germany's political and strategic culture 
during the Cold War years. Two of the best examples of this view are Franco-German 
reconciliation via the European Coal and Steel Community, which began in 1950, and 
Ostpolitik, which started in the mid-1960s; but there are several others worth mentioning. 
In the early 1950s, the U.S. proposal to establish military forces in the FRG met with 
strong opposition from many West Germans. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) even 
tried to argue that rearmament and supporting NATO with German Armed Forces would 
violate the principles of the new German constitution, known as the Basic Law.101 
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When the Bundeswehr was finally established in 1955-56, it was for the limited 
purpose of national self-defense, and most West Germans felt that their country "should 
never again develop a significant power projection capability."102 Every effort was also 
made to firmly ground the Bundeswehr in the new democratic society of West Germany. 
There was no longer a Generalstab headed by military men who could interfere in the 
affairs of the civilian government.103 The concept of Innere Fuehrung, the rights of the 
citizen in uniform, is still an important part of the German soldier's life. Doing away with 
conscription, which has long been seen as a means to ground the armed forces in German 
society, is being hotly debated today.104 
Another example of West Germany's reluctance to develop military capabilities 
to be used as an instrument of foreign policy involves the nuclear weapons option. 
Chancellor Adenauer set a precedent on this subject "at the London Nine Conference in 
October 1954, stating that Germany would not produce atomic, biological or chemical 
weapons on its territory"105 Although this was a necessary precondition for West 
Germany's admission to NATO in 1955, it did not mean that the FRG could never 
cooperate with other countries to produce nuclear weapons on their soil, or one day 
possess such weapons if they had been made somewhere else. Thus, the West German 
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politicians kept the nuclear option open, and Bonn came close to joining the nuclear 
weapons club on a few occasions from the late 1950s until the "Two-plus-Four 
Agreement" in 1990. Nevertheless, persistent doubts and resistance at home, as well as 
pressure from some allies, such as France, Britain and the United States, kept the FRG 
from becoming a nuclear weapons power. 106 
The Germans also demonstrated their steadfast belief in solving inter-state 
disputes by peaceful means through their unwavering support for the international 
institutions which had been developed during the Cold War era to maintain European and 
global stability. These institutions included not only NATO and the UN, but also the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which in 1994 became the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Community 
(EC), which in 1993 became the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union 
(WEU), which had been the agency that watched over West German military 
procurements. 107 Especially noteworthy were the efforts of Germany's leaders to work 
closely with France to develop the EC, which were discussed earlier in this thesis. 
Additionally, the EC and the other institutions fulfilled the requirements of the third 
principle listed above, that the West Germans preferred economic and political 
integration as a means to promote stability. This belief has had the most powerful effect 
106 Ibid., 31-33. That the FRG had an option to become a nuclear weapons power became clear in late 
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on the FRG's foreign policy both during the Cold War and after 1989.108 
The fourth principle, that multilateralism and integration serve concrete German 
interests much better than pursuing a separate national course, or Sonderweg, is also 
closely tied to the preceding analysis. Yet, it is important to stress what a significant 
change of view this is compared to what German political leaders believed before the 
Second World War. Unilateralism, but not in the sense that Germany went it alone, was 
Bismarck's way of maintaining the post-1871 equilibrium in Europe, which quickly 
disintegrated when he was no longer around to keep everything balanced.109 However, 
bilateral politics or unilateralism, was not sufficiently discredited in Germany as the 
cause of the First World War, and German efforts to continue pursuing a special path in 
the interwar years led to the catastrophe that lasted from 1933 to 1945.110 Since that time, 
"German leaders have feared the consequences of unilateralism, believing that it can lead 
only to diplomatic isolation, insecurity, and conflict."111 The previous German inclination 
toward nationalism and unilateralism had been overtaken by a desire to support 
international cooperation and integration, even to the point of sacrificing national 
prerogatives. 
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A fifth and extremely important part o~post-World War II German strategic 
culture is the strong belief in the need for American engagement in Europe to help 
preserve European stability. Unlike the other four principles discussed above, the idea 
that U.S. involvement in Europe was one of the best ways to insure the impartial 
resolution of conflicts in the region had already gained a certain level of acceptance in 
Germany during the interwar years. In fact, most Germans were upset that the Americans 
did not remain more engaged in Europe during the post-First World War period. 112 After 
the Second World War, this belief was reaffirmed. Indeed, maintaining the U.S. 
commitment to Europe became the most important goal of the West Germans throughout 
the Cold War period, and it has had a substantial influence on how the reunited 
Germany's political leaders have approached European integration in order to prevent the 
United States from leaving Europe again. 
Finally, it is important to note that these five principles of German strategic 
culture were not only shaped by the effects of the Second World War, but also by the 
nature of the international structure during the Cold War. Initially, the Soviet threat made 
it necessary for the West Germans to chose integration with the West, and it was only 
later that they could afford to begin a policy of detente with the East bloc.113 Constraints 
on German sovereignty and the choice not to become a nuclear weapons power also 
caused the leaders of the FRG to be exceptionally supportive of their county's integration 
within NATO and to develop additional security measures with their Western 
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partners. 114 The negative attitudes of the rest of Europe toward Germany, based on past 
transgressions, also made it necessary for the FRG ''to adopt policies intended to reassure 
its neighbors that it would never again pose a threat to them and to avoid actions that 
might raise new alarms."115 
C. THE END OF THE COLD WAR TO THE PRESENT, 1989-2000 
No matter how closely the leaders of a unified Germany want to adhere to the 
principles of their nation's political and strategic culture that were developed in the post-
Second World War/Cold War years, they also have to contend with the increasing 
regional and global responsibility that their nation is being asked to assume, especially in 
the area of European security. This means that the German leaders must carefully balance 
the increasing requirements to assert their nation's power with their commitments to 
greater European integration, which dissipates this power. Additionally, as Europe 
becomes more integrated, the German leaders must find a balance between the interests 
that serve their citizens at home, and those of Germany as part of a greater Europe. 116 
The first important debate about Germany behaving as a normal, fully sovereign 
power in matters of European security involved the constitutionality of using the 
country's military forces outside their Cold War role of national defense. Although this 
was a mostly tortuous debate within the FRG, old and new allies alike had quickly come 
to the conclusion that the Germans had to pull their own weight in multilateral efforts to 
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preserve not just European, but also global peace and stability. The GulfWar in 
particular, "showed that other capitals were no longer inclined to accept Germany's 
ducking when military decisions had to be made."117 This debate was partially resolved 
on 12 July 1994, when the German Constitutional Court declared that the country's 
participation in UN peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions was constitutional.118 
Since this time, German military forces have been active in supporting missions under a 
UN mandate in Africa, the Balkans, and as far away as Southeast Asia. However, the 
German Constitutional Court also insured that any decision to send elements of the 
Bundeswehr outside the country to participate in such crisis management missions was 
kept firmly in the hands of the civilian government. Only the Bundestag can approve 
deployments, and once participation in an operation is allowed, the Federal Government 
decides what constraints to put on the role of the German soldiers in that operation. 119 
This debate about projecting military forces outside the country not only 
illustrates the difficulties that Germany's politicians have had to face in making the 
adjustment to the post-Cold War environment, but also shows how the Germans have 
remained committed to their post-World War WCold War strategic culture and are 
finding ways to adapt their values and beliefs to the new international environment. On 
the one hand, as Duffield has argued, the Germans have been slow to accept the need to 
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use military force, except in the case of national defense, in keeping with their rejection 
of militarism and their strong belief in "assigning absolute priority to the search for 
peaceful solutions to international conflicts."120 On the other hand, Duffield has observed, 
the strong German commitment to multilateralism, the concomitant 
rejection of ever pursuing a separate path, and the imperative to be a 
dependable partner have made it difficult for them not to respond 
positively to international requests for German military contributions. 
Not to join with Germany's allies, in the minds of many, would smack 
of unilateralism, harm its international reputation, and risk leading to 
isolation.121 
The strong German preference for economic and political integration as a means 
to promote European stability not only survived the end of the Cold War and German 
unification, but also the change of governments in Bonn/Berlin. Despite worries that the 
new Red-Green coalition, now in charge in Germany after 16 years of Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) -Free Democratic Party (FDP) rule, would follow a 
significantly different course on foreign policy, the opposite has been true. The new 
Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, has made the same point as his predecessor, Helmut 
Kohl, in declaring that Germany's aims are identical with Europe's. The Green Party 
leader and German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, has gone as far as to declare "that 
to tum the EU into a single political state is 'the decisive task of our time. "'122 There is 
also no reason thus far to dissent from John Grimond's assessment of the new German 
government in his article for The Economist in February1999: 
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In general, Germany's foreign policy will be the same as usual, only more 
so. It will be multilateral, not unilateral, if only because the government 
believes there is no big issue in foreign affairs on which a go-it-alone 
policy would be effective. The Germans want a seat on the UN Security 
Council not for themselves but for the EU. In Europe they will be 
integrationist. Even in the G8 they will push for more policy-coordination. 
They will play a bigger part in peacekeeping. And they will continue their 
strong friendship with America, to which they are increasingly bound 
through commercial and educational links, as well as diplomatic ones. 123 
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IV. FRENCHSTRATEGICCULTURE 
A. THE INTERWAR YEARS, 1918-1939 
One of the most important aspects of French political and strategic culture during 
the interwar years that still affects Franco-German cooperation today was the extreme 
atmosphere of mistrust. In fact, when the numerous German states were first joined 
together into a larger nation at the end of the Franco-German War of 1870-71, the French 
had not only lost Alsace and Lorraine, but they were confronted with a new economic 
and military power that they feared from then on. 124 Thus, after experiencing the 
devastation of the First World War mostly on their own soil, the French became adamant 
about punishing the Germans and imposing harsh restrictions on their capabilities. After 
the Versailles Treaty was signed, it was the French who tenaciously tried to make the 
Germans comply with the terms they had been forced to accept: the permanent loss of 
territories, the paying of crippling reparations, and restrictions on their military might. 
However, the French soon found that they were nearly alone in their quest to make the 
Germans abide by these terms. They had lost the support of the United States and Great 
Britain against Germany, and the French leaders could not enlist the help of the new 
Soviet Government. Thus, the French were forced to try another course. France 
established bilateral military alliances with the European states that had the most to lose 
from a resurgent Germany, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland. However, this strategy 
failed due to many problems that developed both within and among France's East 
European allies, and because it was a hopelessly weak and unreliable way of containing 
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Germany in the first place.125 Unfortunately, these lessons from the interwar years served 
to strengthen many aspects of French strategic culture that conflict with European 
integration, especially the belief that France can only count on itself. 
B. THE POST-WORLD WAR II AND COLD WAR YEARS, 1946-1989 
After the Second World War, it took some time for the French to reestablish many 
of the key elements of their political and strategic culture. Adherence to the "need to 
uphold France's rank and status as an independent world power," was an important part 
ofFrench political rhetoric during the time of the Fourth Republic, 1946-58.126 There 
were also attempts by French leaders to assert their independent views during the early 
days of the Western Alliance. As Philip H. Gordon has observed, these attempts included: 
... the insistence on including 'Algerian departments' in the protected zone 
of the 1949 NATO treaty; the proposals and demands of various French 
governments for [a] tripartite (with Britain and the United States) direction 
of the alliance; the constant insistence on military superiority in 
continental Europe, especially over reconstructing Germany; the efforts, 
regardless of cost, to maintain overseas colonies and influence abroad; 
and, finally, the decisions taken toward the creation of a national nuclear 
program and strategic forces were all areas in which France refused to 
accept lightly the developing status quo as directed by W ashington. 127 
Nevertheless, the individual who contributed the most to reconstituting French 
pride and defining France's post-World War II strategic culture was Charles de Gaulle. 
When he returned to lead France after the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958, 
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de Gaulle quickly established the principles that have served as a guide for the policies of 
all subsequent French presidents. The Gaullist principles informing French political and 
strategic culture, as described by Philip H. Gordon, include: 
1. The preoccupation with grandeur. 
2. The unwavering desire to preserve independent decision-making. 
3. The unwillingness to participate in an integrated military command structure. 
4. The continuing aspiration to produce a majority of French weapons in France. 
5. The aversion to a reliance on allies. 128 
The first of these principles, the preoccupation with grandeur, refers to upholding 
France's historic place in Europe and the world as a great power. "As de Gaulle pointed 
out, France 'has acquired over one thousand five hundred years the habit of being a great 
power and insists that everyone, first of all its friends, not forget this. "'129 There are 
arguments to the effect that General de Gaulle's emphasis on restoring France to the role 
of a world leader was necessary for the French people to recover their self respect and 
erase the stigma ofthe defeat that they experienced at the hands of Nazi Germany. 
Moreover, de Gaulle evidently believed that an "internationally powerful and assertive 
France" was essential for Western Europe to free itself from the paralyzing effects of the 
bipolar system. Yet, de Gaulle's position that "France had a special right and duty to play 
the role of a world power simply because it was France" had as much to do with French 
foreign policy during the Cold War period, as any other reason.130 
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The unwavering desire to preserve independent decision-making served several 
purposes. First of all, independence was the means by which to achieve grandeur. France 
could not be tethered by the Atlantic Alliance and still seek its rightful position in the 
world. De Gaulle also believed that maintaining France's independence prevented a 
feeling of dependence, which has a degenerating effect on a nation. In de Gaulle's view, 
dependence makes a nation become "nothing more than a passive follower, ... one step 
away from giving up its interests all together."131 Furthennore, as Gordon has put it, 
independence to de Gaulle was: 
... a way to make sure French interests would not be overlooked by bigger, 
stronger powers or even smaller ones that did not share France's goals. 
Because states had different interests, it could not be in the interest of 
France to sacrifice its ultimate freedom of decision to anyone. Alliances, 
such as NATO and the European Economic Community, were fine and 
even necessary, and de Gaulle certainly took advantage of both. But their 
purpose was to facilitate cooperation, not to replace 'it with hierarchy, 
hegemony, or subservience. Little could be gained, de Gaulle believed-
but much could be lost- by letting others make one's decisions.132 
Finally, de Gaulle insisted that defense was ''the first duty of the state," and "no 
state could maintain authority in the eyes of its citizens if it was seen to rely on a foreign 
power for its very existence."133 Even though it was likely that French soldiers would be 
called upon to fight alongside their allies in future wars, de Gaulle thought it essential 
that France have its own say in how it would fight. 134 Therefore, the General's goal of 
maintaining the French right of independent decision-making contributed to his 
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withdrawal of France from further participation in NATO's integrated military command 
structure in 1966.135 This is a decision that all French presidents after de Gaulle have 
maintained, upholding the tenet of avoiding participation in integrated military command 
structures, while still remaining in an alliance such as NAT0. 136 
The Gaullist principle of aspiring to produce a majority of French weapons in 
France has also been an important method for the leaders in Paris to enhance their 
nation's grandeur and independence. As Professor DavidS. Yost has noted: 
It is taken for granted in the nation's political and strategic culture that 
··France will and must compete in all major dimensions of military-
technological innovations, to the extent of its abilities. This helps to 
explain why France's defense posture in the 1970s and 1980s was 
frequently described as that of a 'mini-superpower.' 137 
In keeping with this principle of self-sufficiency, France produced the same 
variety and types of weapons systems as the United States and the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War, only in lesser quantities. These included everything from tanks, artillery, 
jet aircraft and strategic bombers, to aircraft carriers, nuclear attack submarines, SSBNs, 
and land-based IRBMs. The most valuable means by which the French could claim their 
freedom from relying on NATO, and thereby preserve some level of independent 
decision-making in a European conflict, was clearly their nuclear weapons capability.138 
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The last principle attributed to de Gaulle, the aversion to a reliance on allies, is a 
little misleading, because ever since the time of Napoleon I the French have used bilateral 
and multilateral alliances to support their national defense and to secure their interests 
abroad. In fact, "France has not won a major war on its own since the Napoleonic 
period."139 Yet, almost immediately after de Gaulle established the Fifth Republic in 
1958-1959, well before his official repudiation of the NATO command in 1966, he set 
France on a course to reduce its need to rely on allies. De Gaulle also made sure that the 
five tenets of France's "strategic culture," which he did not invent but stressed throughout 
his presidency, were followed in deed as well as in word. 
The General's first step toward upholding these five principles was to demand 
"equality with America and Britain as a leader ofNAT0."140 Then de Gaulle began to 
sever the ties that the leaders of the Fourth Republic had established with what he 
perceived to be an alliance command structure that was unreasonably dominated by the 
United States.141 He withdrew French ships from NATO's Mediterranean command in 
March 1959, "on the grounds that France might have military responsibilities or interests 
in Africa that other allied countries did not share."142 That same year, de Gaulle would 
not allow NATO to maintain stockpiles of nuclear weapons in France, causing the 
United States to also move the bombers that carried these weapons.143 In 1961, de Gaulle 
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did not subordinate the French troops under NATO who were returning from the 
Algerian conflict that he helped end, but integrated them into a new First Corps, purely 
under national control.144 He made the decisions in 1963 to produce tactical nuclear 
weapons independent from NATO and to withdraw French ships from NATO's Atlantic 
command.145 These decisions were followed by French refusals to participate in forward 
defense exercises with NATO by the mid-1960s, and de Gaulle's final step to make 
France's "independent defense" the official doctrine of his country. Thus, it can be 
argued that the withdrawal ofFrance from NATO's integrated military command 
structure was the result of de Gaulle following his own principles to a logical conclusion, 
as well as his negative reaction to the U.S. doctrine of"flexible response," and his own 
evolving ideas about how France's conventional forces were to be used in relation to its 
growing nuclear capabilities.146 
It is also important to note that while de Gaulle was promoting political 
reconciliation with West Germany in the early 1960s, in order to wean Bonn away from 
the American-controlled alliance "as the first step toward the formation of a truly 
independent West European security system," he was actively sabotaging progress 
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toward European unity in other ways. 147 The main examples of his preventing Western 
European multilateral integration included de Gaulle's repeated vetoes of Britain's entry 
into the Common Market, as well as his obstruction against the entry of Spain and 
Portugal.148 
By the end of 1968, severe economic problems within France and the harsh blow 
of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia caused de Gaulle to soften some ofhis 
hard line policies on French military independence, and even to reconcile some of his 
differences with NATO. The most significant change was a shift away from the doctrine 
of"pure deterrence," and a recognition that French conventional forces had to be 
something more than a tripwire for provoking French strategic nuclear attacks against the 
USSR. Yet, when de Gaulle resigned from the French presidency in April1969, "his 
grand design of a sovereign, self-confident, and respected France, which had always 
taken priority over the pros and cons of specific policies, was well on its way to 
realization." 149 
De Gaulle's successor was his former prime minister, the Gaullist candidate 
Georges Pompidou. Thus, not surprisingly, there were no great revisions in French 
defense policy from June 1969 until Pompidou's death in April1974: "no reintegration 
147 Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World: An International History, 331. "Adenauer's flirtation with 
de Gaulle's projected Paris-Bonn axis seems to have stemmed from his fears that the Kennedy 
administration's flexible response doctrine and its insufficiently belligerent posture during the Berlin crisis 
of 1961-62 heralded a weakening of America's resolve to defend West Germany's security and political 
interests in Central Europe." 
148 Barzini, The Europeans, 148. 
149 Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy, 68. 
52 
,------------------
with NATO and no compromise of the independent nuclear force."150 There were 
attempts to clarify the move away from the "ali-or-nothing deterrence" doctrine toward 
the evolving plan to use France's conventional forces to "test the intentions of an 
adversary" before resorting to nuclear attacks. Nevertheless, the dilemmas associated 
with an independent French defense posture that was also meant to meet the requirements 
of a unified Western European defense remained unresolved.151 Pompidou was better 
disposed toward West European integration in other ways, however, and "finally 
approved Great Britain's entry into the Common Market and helped launch a plan for 
European economic and monetary union."152 
By 1976, the Gaullist, Socialist, and Communist leaders in France were all 
accusing President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of plotting France's return to the integrated 
military command structure ofNATO, and undermining de Gaulle's defense and security 
principles in other ways through his endorsement of French participation in the forward 
battle (bataille de I 'avant) of an East-West conflict in Central Europe. However, these 
were unwarranted accusations against the third president of the Fifth Republic. Neither 
Giscard d'Estaing nor his armed forces chief of staff, General Guy Mery, who published 
an article that supported the president's views, advocated a departure from Gaullist 
military doctrine. Giscard's comments about "Europe being a single strategic zone," and 
the "need for French forces to be organized so as to be able to give battle," echoed the 
ISO Ibid., 68. 
151 Kosk, Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe's Strategic Choices, 
1955-1995, 107-109. 
152 Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy, 69. 
53 
observations in the 1972 White Book on Defense that described Gaullist doctrine.153 
General Mery made it clear that the possibility of French participation in the forward 
battle merely referred to "the existing role of the French First Anny as NATO's 
counterattack reserve, and in no way advocated that French forces take up a position on 
NATO's front lines."154 
Giscard d'Estaing's and General Mery's efforts to increase defense spending on 
conventional arms relative to nuclear forces were based more on the need to limit the 
growing gap between French and German conventional capabilities than on any attempt 
to bring France back into harmony with NATO strategy. Thus, the French president's 
increased attention to his country's conventional forces was based on "the entirely 
Gaullist motive of assuring France the full panoply of military assets necessary for an 
independent foreign policy."155 Nevertheless, continued criticism at home about 
reintegration into NATO and compromising French independence caused Giscard 
d'Estaing's government "to return to ambiguous formulas about optional participation in 
the 'forward battle' in Germany and stressed the national sanctuarization function of 
France's nuclear forces."156 Giscard d'Estaing's views about his country's Gaullist 
national outlook in relation to NATO are best expressed by a statement he made in 1980: 
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There is no contradiction between belonging to an alliance and pursuing 
an independent policy .... IfFrance were to align itself with some other 
country's policy, its policy would be simple, but it would cease to exist. 
Seen from the outside, France would become the province of a superpower 
[that is, the United States]. This is not what our history teaches us [to 
accept], nor is it what our people want. 157 
Despite the facts that Mitterrand was the first Socialist chief of state of the Fifth 
Republic and that he had been General de Gaulle's most severe critic for decades, by 
1981 Mitterrand was implementing a security policy that was firmly based on de Gaulle's 
principles. The transformation of the Socialist Party (PS) in the second half of the 1970s 
toward ·an acceptance of the Gaullist model resulted from both the need to bring the PS in 
line with public opinion on French defense doctrine, and as a reaction to increased Soviet 
militancy in Europe and around the world. Mitterrand's main challenge was to find a way 
to reconcile the Gaullist principles with a greater need for France to contribute more to a 
stronger European defense. 158 
Throughout Mitterrand's two presidencies, in a manner befitting de Gaulle, he 
made it clear that he alone was responsible for French foreign and defense policy, 
especially when it came to nuclear deterrence, an attitude which he often voiced publicly: 
It is I who determine France's foreign policy, not my ministers .... It is not 
conceivable that a policy could be put into action without my agreement, 
or more precisely, without my impetus.159 
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The responsibility of [nuclear] decision lies with the president of the 
Republic, and with the president alone. 160 
In the early 1980s, the main theme ofMitterrand's defense and security policy 
continued to be national independence, "in which independent nuclear weapons 
functioned as a source of both deterrence and national prestige, in which deterrence was 
based on concepts of 'proportionality' and 'uncertainty,' and in which NATO's doctrine 
of 'flexible response' was formally refused."161 The Mitterrand government also 
continued to reject all of the following: "participation in NATO's integrated military 
commands; the deployment of foreign forces on French territory; automatic access of 
allied air forces to French airspace; the automatic engagement of French troops in case of 
conflict; and the occupation of a 'space' on the central front."162 
Nevertheless, as early as 1982, Mitterrand began to adapt certain aspects of 
France's Gaullist doctrine toward a more conciliatory policy with the Atlantic Alliance 
and pursued of a better relationship with the FRG. The first important advance with the 
FRG was "the Kohl-Mitterrand decision of22 October 1982 to implement the defense 
clauses of the Elysee Treaty," and to create a Franco-German Commission on Security 
and Defense with the aim ''to build a greater degree of mutual confidence and consensus 
regarding security matters."163 The second crucial step announced at the end of 1982 was 
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the reorganizing of the French army to play a greater role in the defense of Western 
Europe. The most important aspect of this reorganization effort was the creation of the 
Rapid Action Force, the Force d 'Action Rapide (FAR), which could intervene far 
forward in West Germany. 164 By 1983, the French were also participating in maneuvers 
with the Bundeswehr to show their willingness to take part in forward defense if 
necessary. 165 
In the early to mid-1980s, Mitterrand also made it clear that "the Atlantic Alliance 
was now to be considered, with the nuclear force, one ofthe 'two pillars of security' for 
France," both due to his misgivings about the increasing Soviet threat to Western Europe 
and his determination to encourage the West Germans not to court neutralism as a 
response to the buildup of Soviet power. 166 This new perspective led to more cooperation 
with the United States and the FRG concerning the possible use of nuclear weapons in 
the European theatre. In an unprecedented declaration on 28 February 1986, Mitterrand 
declared "himself disposed to consult the Chancellor of the FRG on the possible 
employment ofprestrategic [tactical nuclear] French weapons on German territory," and 
indicated that he had "decided, with the Chancellor of the FRG, to equip himself with 
technical means for immediate and reliable consultation in times of crisis."167 
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Despite Mitterrand's belief that France had to reinforce NATO against the Soviet · 
threat, and the fact that he had no illusions that an independent Western European 
defense identity could be a substitute for the Atlantic Alliance of the 1980s, he also 
accepted and voiced the Gaullist view that "it would be just as dangerous for Europe to 
abandon itself to the protection of a country outside of our own continent."168 Thus, from 
the beginning of his first presidency, Mitterrand tended to focus most on improving the 
Franco-German relationship over other portions of his country's increased solidarity with 
NATO. The reorganization ofFrench conventional forces was clearly meant to encourage 
German support for the French perspectives on European defense and security, as much 
as to help the U.S.-dominated Alliance. Both the implementation of the Elysee Treaty in 
1982 and the resurrection of the Western European Union (WEU) in 1984 were Paris-
Bonn initiatives.169 
With the beginning of the "cohabitation" period of French government in 1986 
coinciding with the changing conditions in the East-West confrontation affecting 
European security, many West European governments were anxious about French 
stability. They worried that a lack of consensus between the Socialist president and the 
Gaullist prime minister would prevent France from coping with a growing requirement to 
do more for the defense of Western Europe "as the American protectorate eroded."170 
Yet, contrary to these fears, during the two years of cohabitation the French leaders 
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supported each other's efforts to bolster their country's military role inEurope: 
Between 1986 and 1988, Mitterrand and Chirac both sought to augment 
the French commitment to German security, to maintain France's nuclear 
priority, and to improve the French relationship with NATO. Both 
supported the new military program law, the continued implementation of 
the defense clauses of the 1963 Elysee treaty, and the development of a 
joint military brigade with the Germans. When Chirac took the initiative to 
relaunch the Western European Union in 1987 and to sponsor a 'European 
security charter,' Mitterrand backed him, and when Mitterrand approved 
French military maneuvers deep inside the Federal Republic, Chirac 
gladly signed on. Both leaders celebrated the 25th anniversary of the 
Elysee treaty in January 1988, both supported the creation of a Franco-
German Council for Security and Defense, and both broke with precedent 
to attend the March 1988 NATO summit.171 
Nevertheless, there was a key difference between the security strategy of the 
French Right and Left during the cohabitation period. While Chirac and the Right became 
more inclined to favor an Atlanticist strategy of flexible response, Mitterrand and the Left 
reaffirmed the Gaullist principle of pure nuclear deterrence. The Prime Minister 
suggested that France's military response to an attack on the FRG would involve a 
versatile and graduated "range of means," to include the use of French tactical nuclear 
weapons. The president favored the concept ofnonwar, "the idea that the raison d'etre of 
French nuclear weapons was to avoid war rather than win it."172 Ultimately, it was the 
French people who decided which strategy would take precedence, by re-electing 
Mitterrand as president with a clear majority (54 per cent) over Chirac in May 1988. 
Once again, the French had chosen to support the policies of pure deterrence, 
independence, Franco-German cooperation, and detente with the Soviet Union, which 
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de Gaulle had favored in the 1960s. 173 
In 1989, the astonishing collapse of the Eastern bloc, the opening of the Berlin 
Wall, and the implications of German reunification caused the greatest difficulties for 
French defense policy since the start of the Fifth Republic. 174 In the course of the year, 
"developing a military strategy to ensure national interests without conflicting with 
European ones; paying the increasing costs of maintaining nuclear, conventional, and 
global military roles; and finding an accepted balance between defense and disarmament" 
became the key issues that threatened the Gaullist mode1. 175 Moreover, these were long 
term problems that the French government was trying to resolve throughout the 1990s, 
and continues to face today. 
C. THE END OF THE COLD WAR TO THE PRESENT, 1989-2000 
From the end of the Cold War to the present, French officials have deviated from 
the Gaullist principles, making significant progress toward European unification and the 
development of a European Security and Defense Identity. There are two key reasons for 
this change in course. First, one of the lessons learned from leaving the integrated 
military structure ofNATO in 1966 was the realization that France had lost more 
influence in Europe by going its own way than it might have had if it had continued to 
participate in this command arrangement. 176 Thus, in order to maximize their influence 
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over the post-Cold War environment in Europe, French leaders have increased their 
country's involvement in the transatlantic Alliance, and they have become some of the 
most active officials in the region promoting the EU and ESDI.177 Second, France's 
leaders have concluded that the best way to limit the German ''threat" to France's 
national security interests is to form a close bilateral partnership with the Germans and to 
support their full integration in a multilateral institution - the European Union. 178 
However, as stated earlier, French leaders are still struggling with certain elements of 
France's political and strategic culture as they work toward improving their relationship 
with a new NATO, and advancing European integration and the construction of an ESDI. 
From 1989 to 1993, the Socialists and Mitterrand refused to significantly modify 
France's relationship with NATO. As Philip H. Gordon has pointed out: 
.. .it [France] resisted almost all ofNATO's new initiatives, and it seemed 
to see NATO reform as designed to stifle the creation of a European 
security identity. By the end of 1992 France did agree to allow NATO to 
undertake some functional and geographical tasks (specifically, 
peacekeeping on behalf of the UN and CSCE), and certain French leaders 
such as Defense Minister Pierre Joxe began calling for France 'to 
participate more in the future than it has in the past in politico-military 
discussions.' But .. .instead of seeking to reintegrate with NATO and give 
the alliance a new role, Mitterrand reminded his allies that NATO was not 
a 'holy alliance,' and [Roland] Dumas repeatedly made clear that 
'France's relations with NATO have not changed.' 179 
For the Socialist government, one of de Gaulle's objectives- asserting European 
interests vis-a-vis the United States and Russia- was still the main purpose of European 
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integration. "France's willingness to accept the higher degree of integration embodied in 
the Maastricht Treaty signified not the abandonment of national self-assertion but the 
progressive transference of French strategic ambitions from the national to the West 
European level."180 
The center-right opposition, led by Jacques Chirac, argued that reintegration with 
the substantially reduced American forces in Europe would not be the same as when the 
United States had 325,000 soldiers on the continent. Other leaders from the center-right 
coalition of the Rally for the Republic (RPR) and Union for Democracy (UDF) also said 
that "the reasons that led France to take a singular position within NATO are no longer 
valid," and "that the time has come to get away from ambiguities and to be present where 
forces and missions are decided- NAT0."181 However, no opposition leaders called for 
the total reintegration of France into NATO, only into select bodies such as the Military 
Committee, boycotted by France since 1966. Chirac's objective was not so much to 
"enter NATO's existing military structure but rather to reform it radically in the direction 
of better political control of its activities, the trimming of its structures and the use of 
these structures by Europeans as such."182 
Beginning with the cohabitation government led by Prime Minister Eduoard 
Balladur in March 1993, the center-right backed up some of their calls for greater 
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involvement in the Atlantic Alliance by taking full advantage of NATO command assets 
for France's peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, participating in NATO's enforcement 
of the no-fly zone over the former Yugoslavia, and by being the most vocal of the 
European nations in lobbying for more U.S. involvement in the former Yugoslavia. 
Additionally, the French returned to full participation in NATO's Military Committee, 
and not only agreed to take part in the new NATO forum on nuclear non-proliferation but 
to also co-chair it along with the Americans. 183 
Part of the reason that Balladur and later the conservative RPR-UDF government 
of President Jacques Chirac could be more pro-NATO and pro-EU than the Socialists is 
due to their Gaullist roots. Mitterrand and the Socialists always had to be on guard 
against "being accused ofbetraying de Gaulle's legacy."184 Nevertheless, the Balladur 
government also began to have an identity crisis soon after coming to power, and the 
French seemed to be having second thoughts even about their commitments under the 
Maastricht Treaty. The French feared that "each step toward greater integration brought 
them closer to the point where fundamental aspects of national sovereignty would shift 
from the national to the European level," which "posed a challenge to many of the basic 
myths and symbols of French national identity."185 The French also worried that deeper 
integration "might ultimately mean the subordination of French sovereignty to a 
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dominant Germany," with a strategic perspective that downgraded European security 
independence in favor of United States strategic interests. 186 
Despite their numerous concerns, throughout the mid-1990s French leaders 
continued on a path of carrying forward European integration and increased cooperation 
with NATO. In June 1996, the French had an important chance to demonstrate their 
solidarity with the Germans at the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Berlin, with a 
view toward furthering the establishment of a European Security and Defense Identity 
within NATO. This had begun with the SACEUR agreement in January 1993 that 
clarified the command relationship of the Eurocorps under the WEU "separable but not 
separate from" NATO. Contrary to German motives, once again the French clearly 
wanted to use a European identity within the Alliance to give the Europeans greater 
influence over the decision making and control ofNAT0.187 As Professor Guillaume 
Parmentier from the University of Paris has described the situation: 
Admittedly, Germany felt that the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
would provide, if properly used by the Europeans, sufficient opportunity 
for the expression of European identity on the military level, whereas the 
French, like the British, wished to flank the SACEUR with a European 
deputy who would not only replace the SACEUR during his absence but 
would also head any mili~ operations in which the Americans had 
decided not to participate. 18 
Despite their differing motives, the similarity in the French and German positions 
in 1996, as in the early 1990s, pushed ESDI farther along and ''the 'Berlin Signal' well 
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and truly represented the founding act of a European identity within NAT0."189 It is also 
important to note that the acceptance of the WED's relationship to NATO, and allowing 
it recourse to Alliance resources, gave the WEU more credibility "to fulfil its role as the 
armed force of the European Union."190 
After the NATO Berlin meeting in June 1996, the French became more vigorous 
in pushing their diplomatic initiatives within the EU. As Jolyon Howorth has stated: 
Partly in collaboration with Germany, France took the lead in pressing for: 
the inclusion ofPetersberg tasks in the remit of the Maastricht Treaty; the 
reinforcement of the role and competence of the Council ofMinisters in 
all defense matters; the empowerment of the Council to define the aims 
and objectives of the European Union in the defense and security field; the 
reinforcement ofWEU's operational powers; and the eventual merger of 
WEU and the EU.191 
By the mid-1990s, the country that had long rejected integrated command 
structures as a point of principle was deeply involved in developing a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and a security and defense identity for Europe within the Atlantic 
Alliance. Additionally, France was reorganizing its military forces in order to intervene 
more widely in Europe, while also establishing land, sea, and air integrated force 
structures, such as the Eurocorps, EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, and a Franco-British 
Euro Air Group.192 
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Another radical departure from France's Gaullist past was the shift away from an 
emphasis on nuclear weapons toward conventional weapons for power projection.193 
Moreover, for economic reasons, President Chirac continued a trend started by 
Mitterrand to abandon the longstanding Gaullist goal of self-sufficiency in all weapon 
types, "especially in cases where French manufacture has been particularly weak or 
nonexistent: satellite intelligence; command, control and communication equipment; and 
strategic li:ft."194 Instead, the French turned to their European partners to share the costs 
of developing new annaments independent of the United States.195 
In the last half of the 1990s, European integration began to pick up a seemingly 
irreversible momentum from the plan to establish a single European currency, and France 
even appeared to be moving toward full reintegration in NATO. Nevertheless, the 
controversy over the command ofNATO's southern region (AFSOUTH) led to France's 
June 1997 decision to remain outside the Atlantic Alliance's integrated command 
structure. This is a decision that the cohabitation government of President Chirac and 
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin has still not reversed, complicating the development of an 
ESDI within NAT0. 196 
The French have also had problems agreeing with the Germany, Britain, and 
smaller European countries about the concepts needed to form a Common Foreign and 
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Security Policy that will serve to guide the security institutions of the European Union. 
Some of the past conceptual differences that had to be worked out between the French 
and the Germans involved: France's strong support for appointing a "lead-nation" at the 
start of any WEU-led operation, which was opposed by the Germans until May 1997; 
French desires for the European Council and the EU Secretary General to implement 
joint foreign and security policy conflicted with German support for the European 
Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice to oversee the implementation of a CFSP; 
and French efforts to reduce the North Atlantic Council's role in managing NATO assets 
made available for WEU-led operations through the CJTF concept also contrasted with 
German support for NATO controls over the Alliance's own assets.197 The reason French 
and German leaders have been able to compromise on such hard issues is their shared 
dedication to the goal of establishing a CFSP and defense and security identity for 
Europe, regardless of their differing and perhaps contradictory motives for pursuing this 
goal. 
Two of France's most important contributions to advancing a European Security 
and Defense Identity at the beginning of the twenty-first century involve its increasing 
military cooperation with the other European countries and the United States, and the 
growing capabilities of the Eurocorps. The military leaders of France have been 
recommending greater integration of their forces within NATO since the early 1990s, 
after the Gulf War and the early days of the Bosnia conflict showed how much 
technology and training the French forces had missed by remaining outside the integrated 
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command structure of the Atlantic Alliance. 198 Therefore, the French armed forces have 
become more interested in improving their interoperability with NATO by adapting 
French doctrine and command and control capabilities to Alliance standards.199 
Eurocorps successes have included: the full integration of a multinational staff at the 
corps headquarters level and within the French-German Brigade headquarters; two 
rotations of elements from the French-German Brigade in Bosnia-Herzegovina and once 
in Macedonia; and also the rotation ofEurocorps staff elements through the SFOR 
mission in Bosnia.200 However, the achievement that has brought France closest to 
realizing its goal for forming the Eurocorps as a European entity which includes forces 
from Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Luxembourg was the decision by NATO to have the 
Eurocorps headquarters take command of a KFOR rotation on 18 April 2000.201 
198 Tiersky, "French Military Reforms and Strategy," 5. 
199 John Vinocur, "A Push to Redefine Eurocorps Role," International Herald Tribune, 31 May 1999, 
p.4. 
200 Ibid., p. 4. 
201 Kristian Kahrs, "Eurocorps Assumes Command ofKFOR," KFOR Online, 19 Apri12000, 
Available [Online]: [http://kforonline.com/news/report/nr_19aprOO.htm], Apri12000. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The differences between the French and German strategic cultures have been the 
cause for two key dilemmas hindering the Franco-German efforts to establish a viable 
European Security and Defense Identity. The first dilemma stems from a long-standing 
belief by German officials that one of the best ways to guarantee European stability is to 
support both the engagement and leadership role of the United States in the region, which 
they have not been willing to undermine by developing institutions that might threaten 
the American commitment to European security. Such a view has conflicted with the 
long-standing goal of french leaders to develop a more independent Europe in which 
France would have a prominent leadership role and in which U.S. influence would be 
greatly diminished. The second dilemma involves French efforts to reconcile the Gaullist 
principle of preserving national autonomy with an ever-increasing commitment to 
European integration and France's growing role in the integrated defense and security 
architecture of Europe. 
Despite Germany's increased freedom of action as a completely sovereign and 
united state following the end of the Cold War, its leaders have continued to devise and 
execute German defense and security policy almost entirely in cooperation with others 
and within the context of international institutions. JohnS. Duffield and Johannes 
Bohnen reached similar conclusions about Germany in the 1990s: 
Indeed, Germany, more than most other European countries, has 
vigorously sought to maintain, strengthen, and adapt wherever possible the 
regional security institutions that arose during the Cold War - and in some 
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cases to develop new ones. Above all, Germany's commitment to NATO, 
which many doubted at the time of unification, has not wavered. 202 
With the disappearance of an overriding threat and US encouragement to 
further integrate in defence matters, Bonn is more willing than ever to 
promote a distinct European security and defence identity. Germany did 
not become less Atlanticist but, compared to the days of the Cold War, the 
government developed a new determination to work towards a genuine 
European security and defence capability within the framework of 
NAT0?03 
German rejection ofunilateralism for a strong embrace ofmultilateralism as the 
only appropriate mode of conducting security affairs is the prominent feature of German 
strategic culture that developed in the post-World War II/Cold War years. During this 
same period, the belief in the importance of U.S. engagement as being essential to 
European stability matured from a similar view held by many Germans as far back as 
during the early 1920s. 204 Therefore, it would be inaccurate to argue that German 
acceptance and support for the U.S. role in Europe through NATO is only the result of 
the American nuclear and conventional force guarantees during the Cold War. Today, at 
the start of a new century that appears less threatening to the Germans, they still believe 
that the Atlantic Alliance should remain Europe's primary defense and security 
organization. 
From the 1960s when de Gaulle started France on a separate course outside the 
integrated command structure of the Atlantic Alliance until the collapse of the Berlin 
202 Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German 
Security Policy After Unification, 225. 
203 Johannes Bohnen, "Germany," in Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, eds., The European Union 
and National Defense Policy (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 62. 
204 Nelson, Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918-1923, 170-173. 
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Wall in 1989, and even at the beginning of the 1990s, German officials had to maintain a 
balance between their country's relationships with NATO and France. This caused 
German officials to have to work separately with the French to strengthen their defense 
ties, especially during the intervals when U.S. support for European security appeared 
less reliable, but the overriding German commitment to the United States and NATO 
always limited Franco-German defense integration and prevented the establishment of a 
separate European defense and security identity. 
Between the end of 1992 and the spring of 1996, the growing German acceptance 
of international obligations commensurate with the nation's power, particularly in 
European security, along with the growing desire of French leaders to regain a greater say 
in European defense and security policy even at the expense of maintaining their Gaullist 
tradition of independence, had successfully converged with American willingness to 
support the establishment of an ESDI within NATO. Since the June 1996 meeting of 
NATO Defense Ministers in Berlin, which clarified the basic principles for the European 
pillar of the Alliance, there has been important progress in all areas of Europe's defense 
and security architecture. The crucial advances have included: a clearer articulation of a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy for the EU, with an appointed high representative, 
Javier Solana, to oversee further developments of a CFSP; the acceptance and 
implementation of the CJTF concept as the means by which NATO assets can be used to 
support an EU-led operation; and the actual implementation of greater European control 
over operations in the Balkans using NATO assets, such as placing the Kosovo mission 
71 
under the command of a German general, Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, and, as of 18 April2000, 
under the leadership of the Eurocorps and its commanding general, Juan Ortuno of Spain. 
Despite these encouraging advances toward a more viable European Security and 
Defense Identity at the start of the twenty-first century, it is of critical importance to 
remember that France and Germany still have distinct strategic cultures. While the 
leaders of both these countries share the same goals, such as developing a stronger and 
more stable Europe, their motives are not identical. The Germans have a well-established 
belief that the best way to advance their national interests, address their security 
concerns, and prevent a return to destructive nationalistic policies is to firmly ground 
their country in international institutions. Thus, they have supported developing an ESDI 
within NATO, and advancing other institutions to promote -European peace and stability. 
On the other hand, France's success at adapting its strategic culture in order to participate 
in multiple integrated command structures is relatively new in comparison to the FRG. 
Only the center-right Gaullists themselves, who have been a part of or have led the 
French government since 1993, have been able to successfully deviate from the strategic 
norms established by General de Gaulle. Furthermore, the desires of the French to 
promote their national agenda by maximizing their influence over Europe through greater 
involvement in NATO and by developing the EU and ESDI can be interpreted as 
Gaullist aspirations. Additionally, France's realist concern about Germany dominating 
Europe, which is based on a historical mistrust of German power, is another key motive 
for French participation in supporting the FRG's full integration in Europe's multilateral 
institutions. 
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While it is possible to say with some confidence that the Germans will continue 
on a resolute path toward advancing European economic and political integration, 
actively pursuing ways to improve the capabilities of an ESDI within NATO, it is not so 
clear that France will remain dedicated to each of these goals. As long as French leaders 
continue to be influenced by the distinctive approach to foreign and national security 
policy established by Charles de Gaulle, many obstacles to Franco-German cooperation 
in furthering the development and strengthening the capabilities of a European Security 
and Defense Identity will persist in making this a slow process. It is also unclear whether 
past French resistance to the U.S. leadership role in Europe on security affairs will 
resurface and damage the framework of an ESDI serving as the European pillar of 
NATO. 
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